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Schizophrenic patients often do not have the sense that they direct their own
movements or author their own thoughts (passivity phenomena). As willing must
precede movement to be causal and thus generate the sense of agency, it is
possible that the timing between the senses of willing and movement is shortened
in schizophrenia. We tested the subjective perception of this time interval in patients
with schizophrenia using a method based on Libet’s paradigm, in which subjects
specify a time W – the time of willing a movement – and a time M – the time that
movement occurred. Patients with schizophrenia and healthy volunteers made voluntary
movements at times of their own choice while looking at a fast-rotating clock on a
computer screen and reported when their movements were willed and made. We
recorded surface electromyography to determine the time of actual movement, and
electroencephalography to record brain potentials associated with movement. Results
showed a significantly reduced interval between the reported M and W in patients
with respect to the healthy volunteers (p < 0.05). Specifically, patients did not report
a significant difference in the timing of W at 19 ms prior to movement onset and M
at 7.4 ms prior to movement onset (p > 0.05), while the control group experienced a
time W at 100 ms prior to movement onset and this differed significantly from their time
M at 19 ms prior to movement onset (p < 0.01). These results suggest that patients
with schizophrenia do have an altered timing of awareness of action – or an impaired
judgment of the sequence of events – and that this might be etiologic in the development
of the abnormal sense of agency.
Keywords: schizophrenia, agency, passivity phenomena, Bereitschaftspotential, Libet’s clock, readiness
potential, BP
INTRODUCTION
Libet et al. (1983) used a fast-rotating clock to demonstrate in healthy subjects that the
perception of having willed voluntary movement was preceded by cortical activity measurable by
electroencephalography (EEG). Their subjects identified on the clock at what time they decided to
move (time W), and when they had the sense that they moved (time M). The EEG measure was the
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Bereitschaftspotential (BP), a long, slow EEG negativity over the
vertex that begins about 1 s before movement. They concluded
from these results that the sense of deciding to act may not
actually represent a conscious decision, but merely be a conscious
awareness arising in the middle of an unconscious process that
precedes movement.
Since the Libet et al. (1983) experiment, many criticisms
have been raised against his timeline of voluntary movement.
For example, Haggard et al. (1999) proposed the problem of
“prior entry bias,” in which events that require more attention
are perceived as happening earlier. Gomes (2002) found fault
with the requirement to delineate W and M – phenomena which
he finds to be indistinguishable as most people have a “unitary
awareness” of voluntarily moving.
These objections highlight the need for further studies into
the questions raised by Libet et al. (1983) initial experiment.
Many movements, such as walking, are executed and even
corrected without awareness. The driving interest behind this
research is then not only why the mind should be “behind”
the brain in awareness of movement, but why awareness is
necessary at all. Schizophrenia represents a unique case against
“unitary awareness,” as many patients with schizophrenia have
one component of this awareness (the awareness of movement)
without the other (the awareness of deciding to move, or at the
least, misattributing the source agent of W) (Graham et al., 2014).
Schizophrenia comprises a heterogeneous group of mental
disorders characterized by disturbances in form and content
of thought, altered mood, and impaired perspective of self
and external environment and includes symptoms like passivity
(Herbener and Harrow, 2019). Passivity symptoms demonstrate
a crucial, subjective change in how self is experienced and allows
for an external agent to substitute for the self in generating
thoughts, sounds, and movements (Gallagher, 2004; Graham-
Schmidt et al., 2018). Passivity phenomena can then act as
a model for understanding how the normal conjoining of a
motor activity with the intention to move can unravel and
leave a person susceptible to delusions of external control.
Moreover, passivity was found related to the dysfunction
of visuomotor action monitoring, suggesting that psychotic
passivity experiences might result from abnormal central
action monitoring mechanisms (Schnell et al., 2008). Another
possible role would be played by the corollary discharge (CD),
a feedforward mechanism that normally contributes to the
emergence of the sense of agency, and that appears to be
altered in schizophrenia (Poletti et al., 2019). A study found
that the microstructural integrity in the pathway connecting
frontal eye fields (FEFs) with the mediodorsal thalamus (MD)
was compromised in patients affected by schizophrenia. This was
seen related to an oculomotor CD dysfunction and the severity of
psychotic symptoms (Yao et al., 2019).
Healthy people, such as in Libet et al. (1983) study, are
able to identify an experience of will that precedes voluntary
movement and know “I moved.” With W before M, these
people have an awareness of the intention to move and can
appropriately attribute causality (Wegner, 2003). The purpose of
this study is to determine the timing of willing and initiating a
movement in a disease state where the awareness of intention
and action are impaired. We hypothesize that in schizophrenia
patients, the separation between W and M will be shorter than in
healthy volunteers, resulting in an altered sense of causality and
hence conscious will. Moreover, we hypothesize that this altered




Fifteen patients with DSM-IV diagnosis of schizophrenia
(American Psychiatric and Association, 1994) who had
volunteered to participate in the clinical research unit of
the Clinical Brain Disorders Branch at the National Institute of
Mental Health (NIMH) were enrolled. One patient withdrew
from the study due to change in health status. The enrolled
patients were 4 women and 10 men (mean age 28.9 years, range
from 19 to 57 years). Fifteen healthy, age-matched volunteers
were recruited; one withdrew due to change in health status
leaving six women and eight men (mean age 31.3 years, range
from 18 to 57 years). One subject decided to withdraw after
signing the consent but before participating in the study. All
patients were under second-generation antipsychotic treatment,
as required by the National Institute of Neurological Disorders
and Stroke Institutional Review Board who approved this study.
All patients were clinically stable at the time of testing. Patients
were asked to give informed consent. Subjects were able to
demonstrate that they understood, among other factors, that
participation was voluntary, that it would not benefit them, and
that they could withdraw from the study at any time. Patients also
demonstrated that they understood that not participating was an
option. As part of documenting informed consent, patients were
asked to take a written test covering details of the protocol and
its benefits and risks. Patients who were unable to score at least
75% on the written test were excluded.
A neurologist performed the history and physical examination
for schizophrenic patients and healthy volunteers. Patients on
the clinical research unit had to meet rigorous criteria in
order to participate in research. Exclusionary criteria included
history of traumatic brain injury, known comorbid neurological
disorders, including epilepsy, history of drug and alcohol
abuse. A psychiatrist administered clinical rating scales [i.e.,
appropriate sections of the Structured Clinical Interview for
DSM-IV (SCID)] (First et al., 2002). Moreover, since patients
with schizophrenia frequently exhibit deficits in numerous
neurocognitive domains, including attention, the psychiatrist
administered also a comprehensive battery of neuropsychological
tests to determine whether the patients were able to participate
the study. This battery included Wechsler Memory Scale-Revised
(Wechsler, 1987), Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised
(Wechsler, 1981), Trail Making Test A and B (Tombaugh, 2004),
and the vigilance and distractibility versions of the continuous
performance task (CPT) (Gordon and Mettelman, 1987).
Times S, M, W
All participants watched a training video on the tasks. The
researchers followed a standardized script when giving task
instructions. The healthy subjects and schizophrenic patients
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watched a clock presented on a computer screen. The clock was
a circle with a red dot, which revolved around the clockface
in 3 s. A circular scale was marked around the periphery
of the clock, with tick marks at each “5 s” position, actually
marking 250 ms of real time (Figure 1). There were three
sessions, S, W, and M. During the session S, subjects received
a short somatosensory stimulus; during the session W and M
they had to move spontaneously. The computer with the clock
recorded the time somatosensory stimuli were given, as well as
the electromyographic (EMG) onset of movement.
Time S was measured by sessions in which subjects watched
the clock and noted the time at which they perceived a
short somatosensory stimulus (time S), repeated 40 times. The
stimulus was a non-painful electrical shock of an intensity set at
twice the personal sensory perception threshold. The magnitude
of the non-painful stimulation was established by a series
of increasing stimulus intensities to determine the subjective
sensory threshold. This evaluation was performed during a
separate session before the proper experiment. The stimulus
consisted of a 2 ms pulse, delivered by a ring electrode. In one
of the analyses, the sensory stimulation trials were used to adjust
the interpretation of times W and M. Moreover, it was a useful
control for the ability of the subject to report with a minimum
accuracy the time of an objective movement. By Libet et al. (1983)
procedure, we subtracted S from W and M before reporting these
times as results.
Times W and M were measured in sessions in which subjects
were asked to make a voluntary movement with the right
arm approximately every 5–6 turns of the clock. The subjects
voluntarily made a brisk movement of wrist and finger extension,
which was relatively stereotyped, rapid and short in duration.
During this session subjects alternated between blocks of noting
the time at which they had the conscious intention to move, W
(or felt that some external force ordered their movement), and the
time at which they felt the initiation of movement M. The blocks
consisted of 10 movements each, alternating between W and M
as the reported time. Four blocks each of W and M were studied
in total. Subjects were asked to note the time of W, M, and S and
then wait until a few rotations of the clock have passed before
saying the time aloud. This will prevent the presence of artifacts
(due to head movements or speech) that would have affected the
electrophysiological recordings. Furthermore, following Libet’s
procedure, every participant was instructed to keep their gaze
on the center of the clock, even when they had to note the
position of the hand of the clock, to avoid eye movements that
could have produced ocular electrical artifacts. Finally, again in
accordance with Libet’s original experiment, the subjects were
free to blink when they had the urge to so, but were instructed,




EEG was used to record brain electrical potentials throughout the
experiment. A standard EEG electrode cap, with 28 electrodes
placed according to the international 10–20 system, was used
and placed using standard measurements. Impedance was kept
at less than 5 kOhm. The EEG was filtered with a DC-200 Hz
low-pass filter and digitized at a rate of 1000 Hz. The EMG
signal was recorded from disposable surface silver-silver chloride
electrodes over the right extensor digitorum communis in a
bipolar montage. The EMG signal was rectified, integrated, and
fed to a homemade Schmidt trigger that was set to trigger at the
EMG burst onset. An electro-oculogram (EOG) was recorded
in all subjects. Each session was stored in digital format for
off-line analysis.
EEG and EMG Analysis
For all the EEG and EMG analyses we followed the methods
delineated by Karp et al. (1996). Recordings were visually
inspected off-line. Artifacts and insufficiently brisk movements
FIGURE 1 | Experimental task sequence. (A) During every task, the participants were asked to fix the center of the clock (replica of clock used in the study). The
fast-moving red dot rotated clockwise around the perimeter of the clock with a full revolution accomplished in 3 s. The time was reported as for a common clock, so
every 5 s mark was actually 250 ms. (B) The participants were asked to report the time (S) of external electrical stimulation (A) in a separate session, before
performing the task with the W and M conditions. W and M were alternated in four blocks of 10 movements each. The participants were asked to report every time
aloud, after every trial.
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were excluded from analysis. The EOG recording was used
to verify the ocular conditions in every trial, detecting the
epochs affected by blinks, saccades, and generic eye movements.
During W and M trials, epochs were marked and segregated
according to whether the subject was reporting W or M.
Data were epoched accordingly to the rectified EMG burst
onset, considered the trigger for the movement. Specifically,
every epoch had a duration of 4 s, starting 3500 ms before
trigger, until 4500 ms after the trigger. Since the premotor
potential onset is defined by a rise in negativity above baseline
(established as the mean amplitude from approximately −3500
to −3000 ms before EMG onset) in the averaged tracings,
the amplitude of every potential was referred to that baseline
activity. The voltage analysis was focused on the movement-
related cortical potentials (MRCPs). In particular, the MRCP
on the vertex (electrode Cz) was divided into the classical
two components: the Bereitschaftspotential 1 (BP1), the earlier
widespread component, and the Bereitschaftspotential 2 (BP2),
the later steeper component. This was done for both the W and
M trials.
Positive Symptoms
The scale for assessment of positive symptoms (SAPS)
(Andreasen, 1984) was used to assess the severity and presence
of psychotic symptoms in 12 out of the 14 patients. Two patients
declined the assessment. The passivity symptoms were derived
by the following items of the SAPS, belonging to the Delusions
domain: 15, delusions of being controlled; 16, delusions of mind
reading; 17, thought broadcasting; 18, thought insertion; and 19,
thought withdrawal (Frith, 2005; Schnell et al., 2008). The level
range was 0 (none) to 5 (severe). The presence was considered
with a score higher than 0, while for the severity the sum of the
five items was considered. As a control analysis, we similarly
computed the Hallucinations domain (items 1–7), and the whole
Delusions domain (items 8–20).
Statistical Analysis
Noteworthy, Benjamin Libet and colleagues did not provide any
statistical analysis, and the entire work was purely descriptive.
Among the most recent Libet’s replications involving patients,
we found that Jungilligens et al. (2019) compared healthy
volunteers with patients affected by epileptic seizures. They used
a MANOVA with the factor group and the score of scales of
dissociating experience and W–M difference value as dependent
variables. Baek et al. (2017) used Libet’s paradigm with the fMRI.
They divided patients with functional neurological disorders in
two groups, with or without positive motor symptoms, compared
in a simple ANOVA model with healthy volunteers. Edwards
et al. (2011) for a Libet’s replication with healthy volunteers
and patients with psychogenic tremor used a two-way ANOVA
with the condition (M, W) and group (patients and controls)
as main factors.
Regarding the concept of psychotic symptoms, Schnell et al.
(2008) hypothesized a relationship between passivity symptoms
and the BOLD response within the monitoring network during
an object recognition task. To test it, they used a simple
regression analysis only in the patient group. Graham-Schmidt
et al. (2018) tested the experience of lost agency in patients
with Schizophrenia, using the projected hand illusion (PHI) with
active and passive movements. The analyses were performed
with a linear mixed model with questionnaire responses as
the dependent variable and presence of passivity symptoms
(Controls, Current, Past, or Never), movement condition (Active
or Passive), and delay condition (Synchronous or Asynchronous)
as the fixed effects. Yao et al. (2019), using the probabilistic
tractography, analyzed the integrity of the pathway projecting
from the superior colliculus to the FEFs, via the MD. This
pathway conveys oculomotor CD associated with saccadic eye
movements in non-human primates. They used the Spearman
correlation between the measure of the integrity of the path and
the psychotic symptoms. In line with the previous experiments,
we decided to use a linear model and a simple regression for the
symptoms and the reported times only for the patients. Moreover,
we used the S condition to correct the reported times, as follows.
W and M times were compared using a mixed model
where the measures for M and W (Condition) represented
the repeated factor and schizophrenia patients versus healthy
volunteers were the grouping (Group) factor. The subjects were
used as the random factor. We also included an evaluation
of the Bayes factor (BF), as a complementary indicator to
the classical hypothesis testing. This analysis was performed
adjusted for S. Post hoc testing was performed with pairwise
comparisons of estimated marginal means (EMMs) with Tukey
adjustment. p-Values less than 0.05 were considered significant.
The same model was used to analyze the differences in the
onset of the MRCPs (i.e., BP1 and BP2) and the amplitudes
at the time 0 (onset of EMG). Depending on the normality of
data, we performed Pearson’s or Spearman’s rank correlation to
look at relationship between passivity and psychotic symptoms
in schizophrenia.
For all the statistical analysis, we used R (version 4.0.2, R
Core Team, 2018) and GraphPad Prism (version 8.4.0 GraphPad
Software, LLC). The normality of the variable was assessed using
the Shapiro–Wilk test. ROUT test (Q = 1%, Motulsky and Brown,
2006) was used to reveal the presence of eventual outliers.
RESULTS
Differences in Times M and W
Reported times were normally distributed. For the S session
(normality p = 0.5 for the patients, p = 0.1 for the volunteers)
patients with schizophrenia reported feeling the sensory stimuli
at 59.4 ms (SEM 12 ms) after the stimuli were applied. Healthy
volunteers reported time S at 11.7 ms (SEM 14.2 ms) after stimuli
onset. This difference was significant (p = 0.02). Time S was then
used to adjust time W and M on an individual basis as discussed
in the Methods. In Table 1 the three values were reported as
mean and standard error of the mean for both the groups (see
the Supplementary File for the individual values). ROUT test
revealed the presence of one outlier, which was removed from the
statistical model. The mixed model with the reported values of M
and W (adjusted for S) was significant for the Report type factor
(df = 24, F = 7.6, p = 0.011, BF = 2.9) and for the interaction
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TABLE 1 | Results of Times S, M, and W expressed as mean, standard error of






Time S 59.4 (12) 11.7 (14.2) 0.016
Time M* −7.5 (21.6) 28.1 (20.8) 0.7844
Time W* −19.1 (33) −100.8 (25.5) 0.0068
ˆMean times shown in milliseconds. *Times adjusted for Time S.
Report type x Group (df = 24, F = 5.9, p = 0.02, BF = 2.9). The
BF related to the non-significant factors were smaller than 1. Post
hoc comparisons showed that patients with schizophrenia did not
report a significant difference in the timing of M and W (11.7 ms)
(SEM 32.9, p = 0.98, effect size = 0.12). Healthy volunteers by
contrast did show a difference between M and W (128.8 ms)
(SEM 35.1, p = 0.006, effect size = 1.36). In Figure 2 the marginal
means are depicted in a dot and whiskers plot.
As a control analysis, within the schizophrenia group, patients
were asked after the experiment if they “felt a difference” between
Time M and Time W. Four of the patients responded “yes” and
10 responded “no.” For the subjects who felt a difference, their
time W was −151 ms (SEM 51.6) and M was −51 ms (SEM
35.6). In contrast the subjects who did not feel a difference, time
M and W were 33.6 ms (SEM 27.8) and 10 ms (SEM 25.6),
respectively. In the subgroup analysis, there was a significant
difference between patients who felt a difference in W and those
who did not (p = 0.0026).
Positive Symptoms
The mean total score for the SAPS was 19.1 (5.28 SEM).
The presence of passivity symptoms was found in six patients,
and the mean score was 9.67 (1.6 SEM). Five patients did
not have passivity symptoms. The mean total score for the
hallucinations was 5.50 (1.35 SEM), while the mean total score
of hallucinations plus delusions was 16 (3.9 SEM). There was
no correlation between the subjective feeling of a difference
between W and M trials and the severity of passivity symptoms.
There were no correlations found when taking into account
the presence of hallucination symptoms alone (mean 5.50, SEM
FIGURE 2 | Dot and whiskers plot of the estimated marginal means (EMM).
TABLE 2 | Correlation analysis of SAPS with times M and W.
SAPS items Correlation with W p-Value
SAPS total −0.10 0.75
Hallucinations + Delusions −0.20 0.53
Hallucinations −0.18 0.58
Passivity* 0.27 0.61
*Correlation with only six subjects. ˆSpearman r.
4.7) or with hallucinations symptoms together with the delusion
symptoms (Table 2).
Movement Related Cortical Potentials
As a control analysis we analyzed the shape and the onsets
of the MRCPs in both conditions (W and M). Due to the
presence of artifacts, only 11 Healthy volunteers and 10 patients
were analyzed. Figure 3 depicts the average over all subjects
of the MRCPs for W trials and M trials. Table 3 summarizes
FIGURE 3 | (Top) Averaged BP (main line) with standard error of the mean
(shaded area) for all participants shown for electrode CZ for the W trials.
Epoch begins 2.5 s prior to movement onset and 1.5 s after movement.
(Bottom) Averaged BP (main line) with standard error of the mean (shaded
area) for all participants shown for electrode CZ for the M trials. Epoch begins
2.5 s prior to movement onset and 1.5 s after movement.
Frontiers in Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 5 October 2020 | Volume 14 | Article 574472
fnins-14-574472 October 27, 2020 Time: 17:5 # 6
Pirio Richardson et al. Timing of Volition in Schizophrenia
TABLE 3 | Onset time of BP1 and BP2 for W and M in the patients and the
healthy volunteers.
Condition Measure Patients Control
W BP1 onset −2108.0 (−254.3) −2159.2 (−255.5)
BP2 onset −422.8 (−53.2) −546.9 (70.2)
M BP1 onset −2305.6 (263.3) −1971.4 (307.3)
BP2 onset −672.4 (99.2) −556.7 (66.9)
W BP amplitude −5.6 (−1.6) −9.1 (−1.4)
M BP amplitude −7.4 (−1.9) −9.6 (−1.6)
Data are expressed as means (standard error).
the values (mean and SEM) of the amplitudes of the BPs and
the onset of every MRCPs (i.e., BP1 and BP2). The amplitudes
were computed at time 0, in correspondence with the EMG
onset. Two independent mixed models (for amplitude and onset,
respectively) did not unveil any significant difference for Group,
Condition or the interaction (see the Supplementary File for the
individual values). Thus, no post hoc tests were performed.
DISCUSSION
We confirmed the findings of Libet et al. (1983) that in healthy
volunteers, time W follows the onset of the BP but precedes time
M. In contrast, patients with schizophrenia had a similar onset
of BP as healthy volunteers but in most there was no distinct
perception of W preceding M. Importantly, the unconscious
generation of voluntary movement was indistinguishable
between the groups based on the BP analysis, but the conscious
perception of movement generation was clearly different between
the groups. The experience of moving and willing almost merged
in the patient group. These results suggest that patients with
schizophrenia do have an altered timing of awareness of action—
or an impaired judgment of the sequence of events—compared
to healthy individuals. This echoes results found in patients with
functional (psychogenic) tremor and an altered sense of agency
where W was shifted later and M and W were indistinguishable
(Edwards et al., 2011). A similar result was found in subjects
affected by dissociative seizures, brief episodes of disrupted
awareness and behavioral control, who showed a very short
difference between the reported timing of M and W (Jungilligens
et al., 2019). Another Libet-like experiment, using the fMRI,
found that also patients with mixed functional neurological
disorder showed a reduced difference between the reported M
and W (Baek et al., 2017).
Patients with schizophrenia have shown “hyperbinding”
or “hyperassociation” in the conscious experience of events
separated in time, meaning that patients over-associated their
voluntary actions with a sensory cue (Haggard et al., 2003).
In that experiment, patients “over-attributed” their agency
(Haggard et al., 2003). One interpretation of our results is that
schizophrenic patients do have a difference between M and W
just as healthy volunteers, but due to excessive binding, those
events are indistinguishable and reported similarly in time. This
would suggest that agency persists but that the process of willing a
movement and moving are the same—not that the movement was
under alien control or other such phenomena. Alternatively, it is
possible that they are not the same events but so much closer in
time that a distinction is difficult to detect with this methodology.
This is consistent with other work in patients with schizophrenia,
which showed patients tend to underestimate a temporal interval
between events (Franck et al., 2005).
After the task, patients were asked if they “felt a difference”
between W and M, and four patients reported that they did. They
performed similarly to healthy volunteers with time W reported
at 151 ms prior to movement onset. There was no relationship
between their passivity scores or other disease measures to
account for this difference in experience—and performance
on the task. Of note, all patients were on second-generation
antipsychotic medications at the time of the task, which may
have affected the passivity rating scales. It is possible that the
scales used were not adequately sensitive to detect this change. In
addition, the analysis was not powered to detect changes between
individual patient performance—only to look at patients and
healthy volunteers in a group fashion.
One of the important facets of Libet et al. (1983) original
work was the presence of the Bereitschaftspotential preceding
the report of time W. He interpreted this phenomenon as a
temporal progression of movement beginning with subconscious
preparation for movement followed by conscious awareness of
the intention to move—quite proximal to the movement itself.
Other investigators have found BP1 amplitudes reduced and
prolonged latency of BP1 in schizophrenic patients compared to
healthy volunteers (Dreher et al., 1999; Northoff et al., 2000). We
did not find significant differences in latency or in amplitude
between patients and healthy volunteers. There are certainly
differences in study methodology that may account for the
disparate results. In the previous studies, the patients were asked
to make a self-paced movement of the finger every 4–5 s and
fixate their gaze in the middle of a computer screen as opposed to
our study where patients had their focus clearly on the clock and
had to respond to questions of timing. This raises the question of
“attention” versus “intention” in interpreting this work.
Subjects in this experiment were asked after an event occurred
to reconstruct the timing of their intention. Work by Lau et al.
(2004) showed that brain activity differed depending on whether
the subject attended to the W task or the M task. In the
W task, there was increased blood flow in dorsal prefrontal
cortex, intraparietal sulcus and the pre-supplementary motor
area (SMA). They suggested that the pre-SMA activation could be
the reflection of intention; other work suggests that the parietal
cortex is important as well (Sirigu et al., 1999). In any case, the
question of exactly what the subjects are attending to during the
“intention” conditions is an open one (Eagleman, 2004). In all of
these experiments including ours, subjects are asked to “access”
this awareness of movement—if one is not asked, does one still
feel this awareness (Eagleman, 2004)? In a study by Matsuhashi
and Hallett, they developed methodology to measure a time T,
which was not dependent on subjective report of timing—but
was thought to reflect the timing of the conscious intention to
move (Matsuhashi and Hallett, 2008). They, as in our current
work, show that time T was found after the brain had already
begun unconscious preparations for movement (Matsuhashi
and Hallett, 2008). This is again consistent with a generalized
preparation for movement that begins unconsciously and then
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progresses to a conscious awareness of intention. Whether this
intention is generated prior to movement solely or modified
after the movement due to a reconstruction of awareness, is
not entirely clear.
An important point of view in the interpretation of our
results considers the relationship between W and the defect
in the forward model of movement that the brain receives
as the motor signal is generated (Frith et al., 2000). One
model for motor control holds that movements are guided
by mental representations made before the action begins
(Jordan, 1996). By this model, a motor command includes
information on both the current limb position and desired
limb position; the subtraction of these two states (the forward
model) requires the combination of known movements. Tracing
a path that our mind has already made allows us to correct
for errors quickly, integrate external sensory input into the
movement program, and learn from mental practice (Frith
et al., 2000). Frith provided a model according to which
a single cognitive mechanism underlies the symptoms that
characterize schizophrenia: an impairment in self-monitoring, or
failure in meta-representation of one’s own or others’ internal
states and beliefs. Such impairments might be involved in a
disruption of the internal model and the efferent copy of motor
programs, which would lead to a lack of awareness of the
intended action. Such a disruption may also be behind the
experience of delusions of control in which one’s actions are
experienced as if controlled by alien agents or forces. Thus,
even if schizophrenics can make normal, coordinated movement,
they demonstrate less of the benefits predicted by the forward
model: schizophrenics have impaired central error correction
and more difficulty integrating unexpected interference during
acts (Frith et al., 2000). Moreover, Maruff et al. (2003) found
that the abnormal forward modeling in schizophrenics with
passivity included impaired motor imagery: patients often failed
to account for environmental restraints when making imagined
voluntary movements.
More recently, some studies focused on two distinct forward
mechanisms: the integral forward model, and the auxiliary
forward model (Pickering and Clark, 2014). In the former,
perception involves the use of a forward model for the action. In
the latter, the prediction mechanism is implemented by auxiliary
circuits, like the CD, a copy of the motor command used by the
central nervous system to evaluate the sensory consequences of
the actions, and it is this that seems altered in schizophrenia
(Poletti et al., 2019). This approach has been used to explain the
symptoms in schizophrenia: the generation of the forward model
is abnormal. Thus, the prediction of the sensory consequences
of self-generated stimuli is inaccurate and, sometimes, even
attributed to an external source (Wilkinson, 2015). We did
not find any relationship between the performance and either
passivity or SAPS. The limited number of patients with passivity
symptoms might partially account for this result but it may be
hypothesized that the abnormalities in the proposed forward
model are more related to the general presence of positive
symptoms, specific of the disorder, more than their severity.
In this current work, we show that patients with schizophrenia
differ from healthy volunteers in their experience of the will to
move. This altered time sequence may generate an abnormal
experience of causality and, even, an abnormal experience of
conscious will itself – illusion or not (Wegner, 2003).
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